The Mandate: Wait for it…

2 minute read

In re Madison

Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-1073 (October 31, 2025)

Per Curiam Opinion (linked here)

“When a party appeals the denial of a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, all trial court proceedings are stayed by operation of law, and the statutory stay remains in effect until the appeal has been resolved”—more specifically, until the Court of Appeals “signals that the appeal is resolved” by issuing its mandate. Parties must wait until the mandate issues before resuming proceedings in the trial court—a lesson learned the hard way here. 

Madison sued an HOA and a law firm. The law firm filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, which the trial court denied. But the law firm appealed that denial pursuant to TCPRC § 51.014(a)(12), and the Court of Appeals reversed, rendered judgment for the firm, and remanded. After the appeals court denied her motion for rehearing and for reconsideration en banc, Madison timely sought review in the Texas Supreme Court. Even before Madison filed her petition for review, however, the law firm moved for an award of attorney fees under the TCPA, relying on the appeals court’s judgment, and the trial court granted that motion.

The court of appeals declined to set aside the attorney-fees order on mandamus, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Under TCPRC § 51.014(b), the appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss under the TCPA “stays all … proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that appeal.” The Supreme Court explained that an appellate court’s judgment “takes effect” and the appeal is resolved “when the mandate is issued” (quoting Tex. R. App. P. 18.6)—not upon issuance of the appeals court’s opinion and judgment. “When the appellate mandate issues, the automatic stay [under TCPRC § 15.014(b)] expires,” not before. And under Tex. R. App. P. 18.1, a court of appeals cannot issue its mandate until after the Supreme Court has completed or denied a review that has been timely requested or the time to seek such review has expired.

Here, the law firm moved for its fees under the TCPRC, and the trial court granted that motion before the appeals court issued its mandate—even before it could have issued its mandate, since Madison timely sought Supreme Court review of the appeals court’s decision on the merits, and the Supreme Court had not yet ruled. As a result, “the court of appeals’ judgment was not final and had not yet taken effect, so the automatic stay remained operative, and the trial court had no authority to act.” The Supreme Court held, therefore, that “[e]ntertaining and granting the motion for attorney’s fees before the court of appeals’ mandate had issued—indeed, before the court of appeals was authorized to issue its mandate—was an abuse of discretion,” and so the Court granted Madison’s mandamus petition.

Before Filing an Appeal, Remember Your Fundamentals

less than a minute

LRH Real Estate, LLC v. Dallas County

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-25-00771-CV (October 17, 2025)

Chief Justice Koch (Order, linked here) 

Rashad Haiddar, a non-attorney acting pro se, filed an appeal and an appellants’ brief on behalf of himself, LRH Real Estate, LLC, and Autochoice Garland TX, LLC. But neither Haiddar, individually, nor Autochoice was a party to the judgment from which Haiddar appealed. In an order striking appellants’ brief and threatening dismissal of the appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reminded the parties and practitioners of two fundamental rules:

  • “Generally, only parties of record who have been personally aggrieved by the trial court’s judgment have standing to appeal the judgment,” citing State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015); and
  • “[A]ny aggrieved corporate party must be represented by counsel,” citing Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

The Court warned that the appeal would be dismissed unless (a) the corporate parties, LRH Real Estate and Autochoice, retained an attorney to represent them in the appeal, and (b) Haiddar and Autochoice demonstrated that, contrary to the general rule, they do somehow have standing to pursue the appeal of a judgment to which they were not parties.

Irrevocable Trust Administration in Texas: Keeping the Irrevocable Trust on Track—What Every Trustee Needs to Know

4 minute read

Why Should You Care About Trust Administration?

You’ve been appointed as trustee of an irrevocable trust. No big deal, right? Think again. It’s a high-stakes game and understanding how to properly manage an irrevocable trust is crucial. Good administration protects everyone’s interests, keeps you out of legal trouble, and helps the trust do what it was designed to do.

Let’s break down the essentials—no legal jargon, just what you need to know.

1. Follow the Trust’s Distribution Terms—No Shortcuts!

  • Understand the Distribution Language: The trust agreement is your primary authority. It spells out exactly when, how, and to whom distributions must be made. Carefully review the distribution provisions—some trusts require mandatory payments at certain ages or for specific purposes (like health, education, maintenance, or support), while others give the trustee discretion within defined limits.
  • Strictly Follow the Instructions: You must honor the distribution terms as written in the trust agreement, unless they conflict with Texas law. Deviating from these terms can expose you to legal liability. These aren’t guidelines; they are rules.
  • Document Every Distribution: Keep detailed records of each distribution, including the amount, date, recipient, and the specific reason or provision in the trust that authorizes it. This documentation is essential for demonstrating compliance and protecting yourself if questions or disputes arise.
  • Communicate with Beneficiaries: Open and regular communication about how and why distributions are made helps manage expectations and minimize misunderstandings. There may be exception but communication is usually key.

Bottom line: The distribution language in the trust agreement is not optional—trustees must follow it exactly. If you’re ever unsure, seek professional guidance to avoid costly mistakes.

2. Don’t Forget Taxes—The IRS Is Watching

  • Grantor vs. Non-Grantor Trusts: Some irrevocable trusts are treated as “grantor trusts” for tax purposes, meaning the person who created the trust (the grantor) is responsible for paying income taxes on the trust’s income, even though the assets are held in the trust. In contrast, “non-grantor trusts” are separate tax entities and must pay their own income taxes, with the trustee handling the filings and payments. The terms of the trust agreement and how the trust is structured determine which rules apply.
  • Non-Grantor Trusts File Their Own Tax Returns: Most irrevocable trusts must file a federal tax return (IRS Form 1041) if they have any taxable income, $600+ in gross income, or a nonresident alien beneficiary.
  • No Texas State Income Tax: Good news—Texas doesn’t require a separate state return for trusts.
  • Trustee’s Job: For non-grantor trusts, the trustee is responsible for filing returns, reporting income and deductions, and sending out Schedule K-1 forms to beneficiaries. For grantor trusts, the grantor reports the trust’s income on their personal tax return.
  • Pro Tip: Work with a tax professional and keep organized records all year. It makes tax time much less stressful.

3. Crummey Notices—Yes, You Need to Send Them

  • What’s a Crummey Notice? If the trust is used for making annual exclusion gifts, you likely need to send beneficiaries a written notice (a “Crummey notice”) letting them know they can withdraw new contributions within a certain timeframe.
  • Why Bother? Sending this notice is what allows annual exclusion gifts to qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. Miss it, and you could waste valuable exemption and lose valuable tax benefits.
  • Best Practices: Send notices promptly, keep copies, and get written acknowledgments when possible. There’s no official Texas form—just make sure your communication follows the provisions of the trust agreement and is clear and dated.

4. Successor Trustees—Who’s Next in Line?

  • Check the Trust Agreement: It should say who takes over if the current trustee can’t serve. Sometimes it’s a named person; other times, there’s a process (like a vote or court appointment).
  • Exercising Appointment Powers: If you have the authority to appoint a successor trustee—whether as a trustee, beneficiary, or other party—review the trust agreement for the specific process. This may involve providing written notice, obtaining consents, or following a set procedure outlined in the trust. Make sure to document every step, including the acceptance of the new trustee and any required notifications to financial institutions or other parties. Have the successor in place before something happens.
  • Follow the Rules: Texas law usually honors the trust’s instructions for appointing successor trustees. If the trust is silent or the named individuals are unavailable, state law provides default rules, often involving court intervention.
  • Keep Everyone in the Loop: Notify beneficiaries about any changes in trusteeship and update records with banks or other institutions promptly. Clear communication helps ensure a smooth transition and avoids confusion.

5. Stay Proactive—Plan for the Future

  • Review Regularly: Laws and family situations change. Revisit the trust every so often to make sure it still fits the goals and objectives of the trust.
  • Strategic Moves: Even though irrevocable trusts are often thought of as “set in stone,” there can still be opportunities for strategic planning. Trusts can sometimes enter into transactions such as sales and asset swaps. With careful planning and professional guidance, you may be able to adapt the trust to meet evolving needs and maximize benefits for the beneficiaries.
  • Stay Informed: Keep in touch with your estate planner, financial advisor, and tax pro to stay ahead of any changes.

6. General Fiduciary Duties – Know Your Obligations

  • Duties Owed to Beneficiaries: A Trustee is in a fiduciary relationship with the Trust beneficiaries. As such, the Trustee must always act in good faith and in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Some of these fiduciary duties include:
    • Duty of Loyalty: Be careful to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest between yourself and the Trust beneficiaries. Take caution when entering, in your individual capacity, any transaction involving the trust assets or beneficiaries. Even if such transaction is permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, it must be properly structured and disclosed. Contact your legal and financial advisors to avoid potential issues.
    • Duty of Prudence: Manage Trust assets with care. Stay informed about the Trust assets and seek professional advice where needed.
    • Duty of Impartiality: Don’t play favorites! Treat all beneficiaries fairly, and consider the rights and needs of each beneficiary, according to the terms of the Trust Agreement.
    • Duty to Segregate: Never comingle Trust assets with personal assets. Keep the trust property separate and safeguard against loss or waste. Expenses related to a Trust asset should be paid from the appropriate Trust.
  • Breach of Duty: A Trustee who breaches their fiduciary duties may be removed and may be personally liable to the beneficiaries for any losses incurred as a result of the breach.
  • Ask for Help: Don’t guess! When in doubt, contact your professional advisors for guidance.

Final Thoughts

Administering an irrevocable trust isn’t just about paperwork—it’s about protecting the family’s future. By following the trust’s terms, staying on top of taxes, sending required notices, and planning ahead, you’ll keep things running smoothly and avoid costly mistakes.

Questions?

Don’t go it alone. If you’re unsure about any part of trust administration, reach out to a qualified professional for guidance tailored to your situation.

This alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

BONDie & Clyde: Superseding a Non-Monetary Judgment

2 minute read

In re Bonnie Elizabeth Parker

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-24-00809-CV (August 27, 2025)

Chief Justice Koch (Opinion, linked here), and Justices Goldstein and Garcia

In memory and in lore, Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow are inseparable. In fact, however, Bonnie was interred at Crown Hill Memorial Park, while Clyde rests in a Western Heights Cemetery plot several miles away. Invoking Texas Health & Safety Code § 711.004, Bonnie’s niece sought to reunite the two by having Bonnie’s remains removed from Crown Heights and reinterred next to Clyde at Western Heights. But § 711.004(a) allows for disinterment only “with the written consent of the cemetery organization operating the cemetery,” and Crown Hill refused. Subsection 711.004(c), however, provides nevertheless that, when the consents required by subsection 711.004(a) cannot be obtained, remains “may be removed by permission of a county court of the county in which the cemetery is located.” So, off to county court went Bonnie’s niece, where she obtained a permanent injunction ordering Crown Hill to enter into arrangements for Bonnie’s disinterment within 10 days after the judgment.

Crown Hill appealed. When the trial court refused to stay its judgment pending appeal, Crown Hill sought emergency relief in the Dallas Court of Appeals, and that Court obliged.

Treating Crown Hill’s filing as a motion for review under TRAP 24.4, the appeals court held that when a judgment is for something other than money or an interest in property, the trial court ordinarily “must set the amount and type of security that the judgment debtor must post” and allow the appellant to supersede, per TRAP 24.2(a)(3). Here, the Court said, the “appeal will become moot if Crown Hill is not permitted to suspend enforcement of the judgment.” By contrast, allowing Bonnie’s remains to remain at Crown Hill where they have been since 1945 “perfectly preserves the status quo and the parties’ rights pending appeal.” So, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying a stay, set the amount of Crown Hill’s bond at $0, and suspended enforcement of the trial court’s judgment pending disposition of the appeal—leaving Bonnie and Clyde apart, at least for a little while longer.

Texas Enacts Significant New Restrictions on Non-Compete Agreements for Physicians and Health Care Practitioners

4 minute read

Effective September 1, 2025, Texas Senate Bill 1318 (SB 1318) will substantially alter the landscape for non-compete agreements involving physicians and other health care practitioners. This new law amends the Texas Business & Commerce Code to impose strict requirements on the enforceability of restrictive covenants in the health care sector. Employers, practice groups, and health care organizations should review and update their employment and contractor agreements to ensure compliance with these sweeping changes.

Key Provisions of SB 1318

1.   Scope of Application

New and Renewed Contracts. SB 1318 applies to non-compete agreements entered into or renewed on or after September 1, 2025. This will likely mean that old provisions in contracts that auto-renew will become non-compliant when they renew.

More Health Care Providers. The law covers not only physicians licensed by the Texas Medical Board, but also extends similar restrictions to dentists, professional and vocational nurses, and physician assistants. This marks a significant expansion from prior law, which focused primarily on physicians. Interestingly, it does not apply to other providers like podiatrists, chiropractors, or mental health providers.

2.   Duration and Geographic Limitations

  • One-Year Maximum Duration: Any non-compete agreement with a covered health care practitioner may not restrict practice for more than one year following the termination of employment or contractual relationship.
  • Five-Mile Geographic Restriction: The restricted area may not exceed a five-mile radius from the location where the practitioner “primarily practiced” prior to termination. For practitioners working at multiple sites, it is critical to clearly define the “primary practice location” in the agreement to avoid ambiguity and potential disputes.

3.   Buyout Requirement and Cap

  • Mandatory Buyout Provision: All covered non-compete agreements must include a buyout clause, allowing the practitioner to be released from the restriction by paying a specified amount.
  • Buyout Cap: The buyout amount cannot exceed the practitioner’s total annual salary and wages as of the date of separation. This replaces the prior “reasonable price” standard and eliminates the option for arbitration to determine the buyout amount. Employers must ensure that the buyout figure is clearly stated and does not surpass this statutory cap.

4.   Written Clearly and Conspicuously

  • The law requires that all terms and conditions of the non-compete be set forth “clearly and conspicuously” in writing. Vague or ambiguous language may render the agreement unenforceable.

5.   Good Cause Required for Enforcement

  1. If a physician is involuntarily discharged without “good cause,” any non-compete restriction is void and unenforceable. “Good cause” is defined as a reasonable basis for discharge directly related to the physician’s conduct, job performance, or employment record. Employers should maintain thorough documentation of performance and disciplinary issues to support any assertion of good cause.

6.   Additional Patient Access Protections

  • The law preserves existing requirements that non-compete agreements must not deny physicians access to patient lists or medical records and must allow for the continuation of care for patients with acute illnesses.

7.   Preemption of Other Laws

  • SB 1318 expressly preempts any conflicting common law or statutory provisions regarding the enforceability of non-compete agreements for covered practitioners.

Practical Implications and Recommended Actions

1.   Immediate Review

We recommend clients immediately audit their current agreements, particularly focusing on contracts that auto-renew after September 1st. Agreements entered into or renewed on or after September 1, 2025, must comply with the new requirements. Non-compliant provisions will not be enforceable.

2.   Define Primary Practice Location

For practitioners who work at multiple sites or remotely, it is essential to specify the “primary practice location” in the agreement to ensure the enforceability of the five-mile restriction.

3.   Update Termination Protocols

Employers should establish clear protocols for documenting the reasons for any involuntary termination, particularly to demonstrate “good cause” if enforcement of a non-compete is anticipated.

4.   Communicate Changes to Stakeholders

Inform current and prospective employees, as well as human resources and legal teams, about these changes to ensure consistent application and understanding across the organization.

5.   Monitor Existing Agreements

While SB 1318 applies prospectively, courts may look to the new statutory standards when evaluating the reasonableness of pre-existing agreements. Employers should give careful consideration before enforcing older agreements with broader than necessary restrictions.

Consequences for Employers and Practitioners

For employers, failure to comply with SB 1318 may result in non-compete agreements being declared void and unenforceable. This means that an employer may lose the ability to restrict former employees from competing within the defined time and geographic scope, potentially impacting patient retention, business goodwill, and competitive advantage. Additionally, attempting to enforce a non-compliant agreement could expose the employer to legal challenges, increased litigation costs, and reputational harm within the health care community. Employers may also face difficulties in recruiting and retaining talent if their agreements are perceived as overly restrictive or not in line with current law.

For health care practitioners, non-compliance with the new statutory requirements may create uncertainty regarding their post-employment rights and obligations. Employers may now be motivated to allege wrongdoing by the provider to support a determination of “good cause”. Providers subject to overly broad or non-compliant provisions may feel compelled to limit their professional opportunities unnecessarily or may become involved in costly legal disputes to challenge unenforceable provisions.

Given these significant consequences, we recommend that all health care employers and practice groups act now to review and update their agreements and internal procedures. Ensuring compliance with SB 1318 will help protect your organization’s interests, minimize legal risk, and foster a fair and competitive environment for health care professionals.

Conclusion

SB 1318 represents a significant shift in Texas law, reflecting a broader national trend toward limiting restrictive covenants. Non-compliance can have immediate consequences for both employers and health care providers.

For further guidance or assistance in revising your non-compete agreements to comply with SB 1318, please contact our office. Our team is available to provide tailored advice and support to ensure your organization remains compliant and protected.

Carrington Coleman Attorneys Recognized in 2026 Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch List

less than a minute

Carrington Coleman is proud to announce the attorneys selected to the 2026 Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch list. This recognition highlights attorneys who are earlier in their careers for outstanding professional excellence in private practice in America. 

The attorneys selected to the 2026 list are:

Michael O’Brien: Commercial Litigation, Insurance Law

LaCrecia Perkins: Commercial Litigation, Construction Law, Litigation-Real Estate, Real Estate Law

Jordan Brownlow Perry: Labor and Employment Law-Management

Robert Rowe: Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law, Commercial Litigation, Litigation-Bankruptcy, Litigation- Construction

Amanda J. Saunders: Trusts and Estates

Josh Sherman: Commercial Litigation, Criminal Defense: White-Collar

Monique Sneed: Family Law

Shelby K. Taylor: Commercial Litigation, Labor and Employment Law-Employee, Labor and Employment Law-Management, Litigation-Labor and Employment

Lara Yost: Commercial Litigation, Construction Law, Litigation- Construction

More information on Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch can be found at https://www.bestlawyers.com.

Carrington Coleman Attorneys Selected for 2026 Best Lawyers® Distinction

2 minute read

Carrington Coleman is proud to announce the attorneys selected to the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America®. Twenty-three lawyers, including more than half of our partners, in 27 unique practice areas achieved this distinction. In addition, Partner Cathy Altman has been named “Lawyer of the Year” for her work in Construction Law in the Dallas/Fort Worth region. Only one lawyer in each practice area and community is honored with a “Lawyer of the Year” award.

The attorneys selected to the 2026 list are:

Cathy Altman: Construction Law, Litigation-Construction; Lawyer of the Year in Construction Law in Dallas/Fort Worth

Katie Anderson: Commercial Litigation

Mike Birrer: Employment Law-Individuals, Employment Law-Management, Litigation-Labor and Employment

Kenneth E. Carroll: Appellate Practice, Commercial Litigation

Mark A. Castillo: Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law, Litigation-Bankruptcy

D. Lance Currie: Construction Law, Litigation-Construction

David G. Drumm: Real Estate Law

Carmen E. Eiker: Collaborative Law: Family Law, Family Law, Family Law Arbitration, Family Law Mediation

D. Wade Emmert: Health Care Law

Whitney Keltch Green: Collaborative Law: Family Law, Family Law

Kelli M. Hinson: Commercial Litigation, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Law, Product Liability Litigation (Defendants)

Mark C. Howland: Litigation-Intellectual Property, Litigation-Patent

Charles C. Jordan: Environmental Law, Real Estate Law

Jason M. Katz: Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law

Monica W. Latin: Appellate Practice, Arbitration, Bet-the-Company Litigation, Commercial Litigation, Employment Law-Management

Rodney H. Lawson: Litigation-Health Care

Stephen L. Levine: Patent Law, Trademark Law

Ashley McMillan: Trusts and Estates

Christie Newkirk: Employment Law-Management, Labor Law-Management, Litigation-Labor and Employment

Andrea N. Perez: Corporate Law

Jennifer Larson Ryback: Commercial Litigation

Brian P. Shaw: Commercial Litigation

J. Michael Sutherland: Bankruptcy & Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law

Recognition by Best Lawyers is based entirely on peer review. The process is designed to capture the consensus opinion of leading lawyers about the professional abilities of their colleagues within the same geographical area and legal practice area. More information on The Best Lawyers in America® can be found at https://www.bestlawyers.com.

TUTSA Preemption: Texas Court of Appeals Clarifies the Reach of Trade Secret Claims

2 minute read

Coe v. DNOW LP,__ S.W.3d __, No. 14-23-00410-CV, 2025 WL 1759382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2025, no pet. h.).
Chief Justice Christopher, Justice Wise 

The Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) has long been the primary vehicle for civil claims involving misappropriation of trade secrets in Texas. But just how far does TUTSA’s reach extend? The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently tackled that question head-on in Coe v. DNOW LP, holding that TUTSA preempts any claim that relies on the same facts as a trade secret misappropriation claim—including conspiracy, civil theft, and certain breach of fiduciary duty claims. 

Background: A Mass Exodus and a Trade Secrets Showdown

DNOW, a pump seller, faced a mass departure of employees—around thirty in all—who left to join a direct competitor, Permian Pump & Valve. DNOW alleged that thirteen of those former employees, along with Permian and its owner, not only misappropriated trade secrets but also conspired to do so, committed civil theft, and (for some) breached fiduciary duties. The jury sided with DNOW, and the trial court awarded damages and attorney’s fees on all fronts. On appeal, the defendants argued (among other things) that TUTSA should preempt the duplicative theories. 

The Court’s Analysis: “Same Facts” Means Preemption

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals made clear that TUTSA’s preemption provision is not just window dressing. To this end, it adopted the “compare-the-facts” or “same conduct” test: if a claim is based on the same conduct as a trade secret misappropriation claim, it is preempted by TUTSA. Simply adding an extra element (like an agreement in a conspiracy claim) cannot save a claim from preemption if the underlying facts are the same. 

The court was explicit: “if proof of some other theory of liability would also prove misappropriation of a trade secret, then a claim under that other theory of liability is preempted.” This effectively prevents “artful pleading” that would otherwise allow plaintiffs to sidestep TUTSA’s preemption framework by re-labeling their claims. 

However, the court drew a line between trade secrets and mere confidential information. Claims based on the misuse of confidential information that does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret are not preempted by TUTSA and may proceed. But if the claim is, at its core, about trade secret misappropriation, TUTSA is the exclusive remedy. 

Impact: Conspiracy, Civil Theft, and Fiduciary Duty Claims Narrowed

  • Conspiracy: Claims for conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets are preempted. Plaintiffs cannot use conspiracy as a workaround to impose joint and several liability for trade secret misappropriation. 
  • Civil Theft (TTLA): Claims under the Texas Theft Liability Act that are based on the same facts as a TUTSA claim are preempted (the court also clarified that mere copying of information, without intent to deprive the owner of its use, does not constitute theft under the TTLA).
  • Breach of Fiduciary Duty: To the extent these claims are based on trade secret misappropriation, they are preempted. However, claims based on misuse of confidential information that fall short of trade secret status can still be brought.

Bottom Line

Coe v. DNOW LP is a significant development for Texas trade secrets litigation. The decision reinforces TUTSA’s role as the exclusive civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation and sharply limits the ability to pursue overlapping claims based on the same facts. For businesses, this means careful attention must be paid to how claims are pleaded and to the distinction between trade secrets and other confidential information. Plaintiffs and defendants alike should expect courts to scrutinize the factual basis of each claim and to enforce TUTSA’s preemptive effect with rigor. 

Another Permissive Appeal Bites the Dust

2 minute read

FCA US LLC v. Adient US, LLC

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-25-00836-CV (July 28, 2025)

Justices Smith, Clinton (Opinion, linked here), and Barbare

Petitions to pursue permissive appeals continue to fare poorly, with the Courts of Appeals insisting on strict compliance with TRCP 168 and TCPRC § 51.014(d) and denying petitions that don’t dot every  “i” and cross every “t.” 

Adient secured a summary judgment dismissing FCA’s claims against it. The trial court denied FCA’s motion to reconsider, but granted its request for leave to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal pursuant to TRCP 168 and TCPRC § 51.014(d). The court found (1) that its “rulings involve a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”—specifically, the scope and application of “the component-part-supplier doctrine, announced in Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2004)” and an exception to that doctrine—and also (2) that an interlocutory appeal of the issue “may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation”—i.e., it addressed both prongs of Rule 168 and § 51.014(d), or so it thought.

The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected FCA’s petition to pursue its permissive interlocutory appeal. The Court explained that it “strictly construe[s] applications for permissive appeals because statutes allowing for interlocutory appeals are an exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.” Here, the Court said, the trial court’s order did not comply with Rule 168’s requirement that it “state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” It just broadly asserted that an interlocutory appeal might advance ultimate termination of the litigation, without saying why that was so.  The appeals court held that, “The order’s rote recitation of possible material advancement—without an explanation of ‘why’ immediate appeal may advance ultimate termination of the litigation—fails to satisfy an express requirement of Rule 168.” The appeals court rejected FCA’s argument that the “why” could be inferred from the trial court’s order and its context—i.e., that absent an interlocutory appeal, the purported “summary-judgment error could result in an unnecessary trial without Adient as a party.” Strict compliance with Rule 168 requires that the trial court’s order “state” why an interlocutory appeal may materially advance termination of the litigation.

Texas Legislature Tweaks Timing to Report Suspected Child Abuse or Neglect for Professionals

2 minute read

With the new school year approaching, schools and youth organizations should update their policies to reflect changes found in SB 571, which amends the Texas Education Code and Texas Family Code with expedited timelines for the reporting obligations of professionals who reasonably suspect child abuse or neglect.  These changes impact both public and private schools.

Key Changes

1. Professionals Have 24 Hours to Report                 

Already effective as of June 20, 2025, a large range of professionals—including employees (arguably even when working in a volunteer role for their employer or another organization)—must comply with a shortened reporting deadline. A professional with reasonable cause to believe a child has been abused or neglected now has a non-delegable duty to make a report within 24 hours of first having reasonable cause to believe abuse or neglect of a child has occurred. This is quicker than the previous 48-hour requirement. Texas Family Code § 261.101(b).

In this context, “professional” is broadly defined to include teachers, nurses, doctors, day-care employees, employees of a clinic or health care facility that provides reproductive services, juvenile probation officers, and juvenile detention or correctional officers. Even when working in a volunteer capacity, those who fit this definition should report within 24 hours.

2. Public Schools Have New and Quicker Reporting Deadlines     

A principal of a public school has the further obligation to notify the superintendent or director within 48 hours of becoming aware of evidence an educator engaged in abuse, an unlawful act, involvement or solicitation of a romantic relationship, solicitation or engaging in sexual contact, inappropriate communications, or failure to maintain appropriate boundaries with a student or minor. Texas Education Code § 22A.051(c).

Similarly, the superintendent or director of a public school, after receiving notice or otherwise becoming aware of the same evidence listed above, must file a report with the State Board of Education Certification within 48 hours. This report must be made through TEA’s internet portal. Texas Education Code § 22A.051(d).

This 48-hour deadline exists alongside the 7-business-day deadlines that principals, superintendents, and directors must still follow in other reporting circumstances.

3. Private Schools Have New Obligation

The Chief Administrative Officer of a private school now has the same obligation as a superintendent or director of a public school: upon becoming aware of evidence an educator engaged in abuse, an unlawful act, involvement or solicitation of a romantic relationship, solicitation or engaging in sexual contact, inappropriate communications, or failure to maintain appropriate boundaries with a student or minor, the Chief Administrative Officer must notify the State Board of Educator Certification within 48 hours by filing a report through TEA’s internet portal. Texas Education Code § 22A.301(a), (c), (d).

Protecting Your Professionals

Ahead of the 2025-2026 school year, clients should review and update employee handbooks, training material on abuse and neglect reporting, and any additional internal documents to reflect the new 24-hour reporting requirements. Additionally, public and private schools alike should update reporting policies regarding the new duty of principals, superintendents, directors, and chief administrative officers to complete the online report within 48 hours.

Failure to comply with these new deadlines may result in prosecution for failure to report child abuse. A felony indictment may be presented within four years from the date the offense was discovered; an indictment may be presented within three years from the date the offense was discovered.

Please let us know if we can assist you in navigating the new legislation, updating your policy language, or analyzing how this impacts your organization.