The Emergence of Professional Student-Athletes: NCAA Rules and State NIL Regulations

By: Kylie T. Jennings

Historically, student-athletes have been prohibited from being compensated for their play in any form outside of scholarships covering the cost of attendance at their school. While the NCAA generates billions of dollars in revenue annually, NCAA rules have consistently restricted student-athletes’ ability to receive compensation. The NCAA begrudgingly voted to loosen some of its restrictions on student-athlete compensation in June 2021 after a unanimous loss before the U.S. Supreme Court in NCAA v. Alston. It has now been a little over a year since the NCAA adopted an interim policy to allow student-athletes to be compensated for use of their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”), and while the NCAA Division I Board of Directors issued a statement in May 2022 offering broad guidance targeted at boosters in an effort to crack down on potential violations, the NCAA has still not issued further detailed guidance in hopes that Congress will adopt federal legislation instead.  

While the interim policy does allow student-athletes to receive compensation from third parties in exchange for use of their NIL, the interim rules continue the NCAA’s prohibition on pay-for-play and improper recruiting inducements.

The NCAA interim policy still does not allow student-athletes to receive any compensation from their school, and the athlete may only be paid for actual services rendered that utilize their NIL (e.g., signing autographs, making personal appearances, posting promoted social media posts, etc.). The NCAA NIL policy continues to prohibit anyone – including institutions and unrelated third parties – from paying student-athletes for athletic participation or achievement. Athletes and recruits are also strictly prohibited from being paid during their recruitment process as an improper inducement to attend, and compete for, a particular school.

In addition to the NCAA policy, there are currently twenty-nine states that have adopted laws governing NIL. Schools, student-athletes, and unaffiliated third parties in those twenty-nine states must comply with their relevant state law as well as the NCAA policies. In any case, where state law conflicts with the NCAA rules, state law supersedes.

Texas, for example, is one of the stricter states with regard to NIL regulations. The Texas NIL law (SB 1385) allows student-athletes to be paid for use of their NIL when the athlete is not engaged in official team activities. The Texas law requires athletes to attend a financial literacy and life skills workshop at the beginning of the athlete’s first and third academic years at their school in an effort to provide student-athletes guidance on how to manage money and navigate other practical issues that may arise from the athlete’s compensation from NIL deals.

Texas, like many other states, also restricts a student-athlete’s ability to enter into a contract for the use of their NIL if compensation is provided in exchange for an endorsement of alcohol, tobacco products, e-cigarettes or any other similar device, anabolic steroids, sports betting, casino gambling, a firearm the student-athlete cannot legally purchase, or a sexually oriented business. In addition, SB 1385 prohibits student-athletes from entering into any contract that conflicts with any institutional contracts or policies of the student’s school or team.

An important practical point for student-athletes and their families to note is that the NCAA NIL policy, as well as the Texas law, allows for student-athletes to engage professional services providers, such as attorneys, agents, and accountants, to assist with any permissible NIL activities. In order to ensure compliance with the rules, it is likely best practice for schools, sponsors, and student-athletes to engage professionals to take a detailed review of both potential NIL contracts and the school or team’s contracts. 

The law also requires the athlete to disclose any proposed contract for the use of their NIL to their school. In addition to complying with the biggest piece of NIL regulation – ensuring that any NIL deals do not violate the “pay-for-play” rules – familiarity with both institutional contracts and NIL agreements is going to be a key component for all parties to a NIL deal to make sure they are staying within the confines of the rules.     

Given the importance of compliance with both NCAA and state rules, schools and student-athletes would be wise to engage professional advisors in connection with any NIL programs or deals. Student-athletes and their families would benefit from, and should consider, having an experienced attorney or other professional review any agreements that the athlete may sign before entering into any NIL deals. The NIL space is sure to further evolve and grow as more people want to get involved, and both NCAA and state regulations will likely follow. Carrington Coleman’s Sports Law Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and provide updates as the industry changes.

ENABLERS Act: Further Developments in Anti-Money Laundering Regulations Affecting Art and Antiquities Transactions

By: Andrea N. Perez

At the end of June, Congress took a big step toward passing anti-money laundering regulations that will profoundly affect the art and antiquities market. The bipartisan-proposed Establishing New Authorities for Businesses Laundering and Enabling Risks to Security Act (the “ENABLERS Act”) was approved to be included in the annual National Defense Authorization Act, which provides the budget for the Department of Defense. By backdooring the ENABLERS Act into the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress will likely enact it later this year as part of its approval of the Defense Authorization Act.

The creation of the ENABLERS Act is rooted in the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (the “AMLA”) that went into effect on January 1, 2021. AMLA provides massive updates to the 52-year-old Bank Secrecy Act and is the largest overhaul of money laundering regulations since the Patriot Act. It vastly expands the reach of the Bank Secrecy Act by applying to many more types of companies, persons, and intermediaries in hopes of cracking down on money laundering. For the first time in the United States, the list of parties subject to these regulations include art and antiquities dealers.

In November of 2021, Paula Trommel, Compliance and Sanctions Consultant for Christie’s and Deputy Director of Corinth Consulting in London, joined me to speak about the AMLA and provide our predictions on how this new act would impact the art and antiquities markets. But since the implementation of the AMLA, Congress has provided little guidance on the exact regulations to be imposed, leaving significant uncertainty among those in the art and antiquities markets. While the ENABLERS Act helps clear the fog a little, there continue to be more questions than answers.

If the ENABLERS Act passes, any person or company engaged in the trade and sale of works of art, antiquities, or collectibles – specifically including dealers, advisors, consultants, custodians, galleries, auction houses, and museums – will be deemed to be “financial institutions” and must comply with certain portions of the Bank Secrecy Act. This list of impacted parties in the art and antiquities markets is incredibly larger than originally proposed in the ALMA. Not only will international auction companies like Sotheby’s and Christie’s now be subject to the Bank Secrecy Act, but also small galleries that may only have one to two employees.

The ENABLERS Act will effectively require all art, antiquities, and collectibles dealers, advisors, consultants, custodians, galleries, auction houses, and museums to comply with four due diligence requirements described in more detail in Section 5318 of the United States Code: (1) report suspicious transactions, (2) establish an anti-money laundering program, (3) establish due diligence policies, procedures, and controls, and (4) identify and verify account holders (i.e., individual buyers and sellers). If the ENABLERS Act is passed, these compliance requirements will become effective on or after June 24, 2024, providing some time for those impacted to prepare.

Though these specifics shed light on the reporting requirements intended to combat money laundering in art, antiquities, and collectibles transactions, there are still crucial issues that remain unresolved. Like the AMLA, the ENABLERS Act fails to define what dollar value of art, antiquities, or collectibles transactions will be subject to disclosure to the federal government as well as what constitutes “art, antiquities, or a collectible.” It is frustrating that these vital financial protections are not only unclear, but also thus far unimplemented. That said, we remain hopeful that the progress will continue, and we will soon have robust and well-defined regulations in place to ensure appropriate transparency in the marketplace.

NCAA’s Interim Name, Image, and Likeness Policy – Guidance for Third-Party Involvement

By: Jason M. Katz

The NCAA’s suspension of its name, image, and likeness rules in 2021 created new opportunities for college athletes.   The gist of the shift in this decision by the NCCA is that college athletes may now profit from their name, image, and likeness.  However, one of the biggest issues since the loosening of the NIL policy is the lack of guidance from the NCAA other than stating that its interim policy issued in June 2021 would remain in place until federal legislation or new NCAA rules were adopted.  The NCAA recently released some guidance that schools, third‑parties, prospective student-athletes, and student-athletes need to understand – most importantly that third-parties may be defined as boosters.  Given this implication, both prospective and current student-athletes that are choosing a school or entering the transfer portal need to be wary in dealing with NIL agreements when interacting with schools and potential transfer destinations.

One of the current trends is the formation of collectives by individuals associated with specific schools to arrange and broker NIL opportunities for athletes at that school.  “Collectives” is the term now used to describe pools of boosters, fans, and donors that are raising funds to provide student-athletes with NIL deals across the country.  These collectives are typically school-specific, and some are even sport and/or position-specific, and they vary in levels of sophistication, amount of funds, and services provided. There are over 70 different collectives and many others of all shapes and sizes are being established throughout the country in the wake of NIL.

The NCAA guidance does not specifically refer to collectives by name, but it is clear that the NCAA is sending a message loud and clear to third-parties that fall under the NCAA’s definition of a booster: it is improper for a third-party booster to induce prospective and/or current student-athletes to enroll in a school in exchange for a NIL deal, and each NIL agreement must be based on an independent, case-by-case analysis of the value that each athlete brings to an NIL agreement.  Specifically, a third-party group that qualifies as a booster may not:

  • Engage in recruiting conversations with a prospective student-athlete;
  • Communicate with a prospective student-athlete for a recruiting purpose or to encourage the enrollment at a particular institution;
  • Guarantee a name, image, and likeness deal or promise contingent on initial or continuing enrollment at a particular institution;
  • Work with institutional coaches and staff to arrange meetings with prospective student-athletes; or
  • Offer prospective student-athletes compensation or incentives for enrollment decisions (e.g., signing a letter of intent or transferring), athletic performance (e.g., points scored, minutes played, winning a contest), achievement (e.g., starting position, award winner), or membership on a team.

The NCAA guidance also refers to certain existing specific Division I Legislation: NCAA bylaw 11.1.3 (representing individuals in marketing athletics ability/reputation), NCAA bylaw 13.10 (publicity), NCAA bylaw 12.1.2.1 (permissive recruiters), NCAA bylaw 13.02.14 (definition of recruiting), and NCAA bylaw 13.2.1 (offers and inducements).  The NCAA guidance signals that it expects current NCAA bylaws related to recruiting and pay-for-play to be followed.  Any institution, booster, or player that violates these existing NCAA rules could face NCAA infractions.  Based on the recent NCAA guidance, the story is just beginning to be written on NIL issues.  The NCAA guidance reflects the NCAA’s intention to crack down on any third-party booster and/or school that violates recruiting and pay-for-play rules that are currently in place.  Given the very public demands of high-profile players around the country and open discussion of collectives and affluent boosters associated with certain schools, there will certainly be an adjustment period for all involved to make sure the rules that are in place are followed.  One thing is clear – if a school or organization affiliated with a school, induces players to come to enroll in that school using promised compensation and NIL deals, there will be penalties handed down by the NCAA.

Given the NCAA guidance, an open question is: how, if at all, can a third-party such as a collective enter into NIL with athletes without implying an expectation that the student-athlete attends the school associated with the collective?

Alex More Honored as Cryptocurrency/Blockchain/Fintech Trailblazer

Carrington Coleman partner and head of litigation Alex More is one of two Texas attorneys, and among just 24 nationwide, honored by the National Law Journal as Trailblazers in the area of Cryptocurrency/Blockchain/Fintech law.

An early advocate for blockchain startups and entrepreneurs looking for assistance navigating the myriad emerging legal challenges of this emerging sector, Mr. More was selected to the publication’s 2022 list based upon his groundbreaking work in matters involving virtual tokens, DeFi implementation, financial transactions, emerging regulations, and governmental investigations. 

“Current adoption of cryptocurrencies roughly corresponds to adoption of the internet at the turn of the century,” Mr. More told the NLJ. “Countless entrepreneurs seek to develop new blockchain companies backed by a wide range of institutional investors. Meanwhile, regulators struggle to keep up with the pace of innovation. The best lawyers in this space will prove instrumental in bridging the gap between the new technology and the old legal regimes.”

To read Mr. More’s profile in the 2022 Cryptocurrency/Blockchain/Fintech Trailblazers guide, visit the National Law Journal’s special supplement.

Best Lawyers® Ones to Watch Honors 11 Carrington Coleman Attorneys

Carrington Coleman is proud to announce 11 of our attorneys have been selected to the 2023 Ones to Watch legal guide.

Released as a companion to Best Lawyers in America®, the listing recognizes the country’s leading young attorneys.

“Carrington Coleman is known for providing exceptional legal service,” said Managing Partner Monica Latin. “We are fortunate to have an impressive slate of talented young attorneys working alongside proven leaders.”

Selected to the 2023 Best Lawyers® Ones to Watch listing are:

Dorlin Armijo: Commercial Litigation
Stephanie Assi: Bankruptcy Litigation
Monica Gaudioso: Commercial Litigation, Appellate
Chelsea Glover: Antitrust Litigation
Parker Graham: Commercial Litigation, Labor and Employment (Management) Law, Labor and Employment Litigation
Michael Lin: Real Estate Law
Debrán O’Neil: Commercial Litigation, Health Care Law, Medical Malpractice Law Defense
Marisa O’Sullivan: Commercial Litigation, Insurance Law
Chad Ray: Commercial Litigation
Brent Rubin: Commercial Litigation
Tania Sethi: Real Estate Litigation, Appellate

18 Carrington Coleman Lawyers Recognized By Best Lawyers®, Including 2 Honored as Lawyers of the Year

Eighteen Carrington Coleman attorneys, representing 26 unique practice areas, have been selected for the 2023 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America©.

Two partners earned the additional distinction of being named Dallas Lawyers of the Year in their practice areas. Bruce Collins was named Lawyer of the Year for Regulatory (SEC, Telecom, Energy) Enforcement Litigation, with George Lee recognized for Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity Law.

“We are particularly proud of Bruce and George’s honors. They truly are the best at what they do,” said Managing Partner Monica Latin. “The breadth of experience represented in this year’s selections speaks highly of our attorneys’ ongoing commitment to excellence in serving the needs of our clients. Please join us in congratulating our colleagues who were recognized among the Best Lawyers®.”

The attorneys selected to the 2023 listing are:

Cathy Altman: Construction Law, Construction Litigation
Mike Birrer: Employment (Individuals) Law, Employment (Management) Law, Labor and Employment Litigation
Robert Botts: Trusts & Estates
Ken Carroll: Appellate, Commercial Litigation
Bruce Collins: Securities Litigation, Commercial Litigation; Lawyer of the Year – Regulatory Enforcement (SEC, Telecom, Energy) Litigation
Lance Currie: Construction Law, Construction Litigation
David Drumm: Real Estate Law
Carmen Eiker: Family Law, Family Law Mediation
Whitney Keltch Green: Family Law
Kelli Hinson: Commercial Litigation, Product Liability Litigation Defense
Mark Howland: Patent Litigation, IP Litigation
Charles Jordan: Real Estate Law, Environmental Law
Monica Latin: Commercial Litigation, Bet-the-Company Litigation, Employment (Management) Law, Appellate
George Lee: Corporate Law, Financial Services Regulation Law; Lawyer of the Year – Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity Law
Steve Levine: Patent Law
Bret Madole: Business Organizations (including LLCs and Partnerships), Closely Held Companies and Family Businesses Law
Christie Newkirk: Employment (Management) Law, Labor & Employment Litigation
Mike Sutherland: Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law

No Joint and Several Liability for Punitive Damages—Even On a Default Judgment

Full of Faith Cristian Center, Inc. v. May 

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00859-CV (August 11, 2022) 
Justices Reichek, Nowell (opinion available here), and Carlyle 

It pays to follow the rules, even when you’re just proving up a default judgment. The Mays obtained a default judgment against defendants Full of Faith Christian Center and its principals in a case alleging nuisance, trespass, negligence, and unlawful diversion of water. The trial court entered judgment awarding actual and punitive damages against all defendants jointly and severally. 


The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected all of the defendants’ arguments on appeal concerning the citation and adequacy of service and would have affirmed the judgment. But it held the trial court erred in rendering judgment awarding punitive damages against all defendants jointly and severally. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 41.006 provides that, in any action in which there are two or more defendants, an award of exemplary damages must be specific as to a defendant, and each defendant is liable only for the amount of the award made against that defendant. The Court therefore reversed for a new trial on punitive damages only.

Divided En Banc Court Holds Arbitrators Must Decide Arbitrability When Arbitration Agreement Incorporates AAA Rules

Prestonwood Tradition, LP v. Jennings 

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00380-CV (August 5, 2022) 
En Banc (Pedersen majority opinion available here
herehere)

 

A divided en banc Dallas Court of Appeals has held that arbitrators—not a court—must decide arbitrability issues when an arbitration agreement incorporates the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules—even when the AAA administratively declines to decide the issue without direction from a court. 
      
Several residents of The Tradition-Prestonwood senior living community died in 2016. Representatives of the residents’ estates raised wrongful death and survivorship claims against the owners of the facility. The owners commenced AAA arbitrations based on agreements in their leases with the deceased residents. These arbitration agreements stated, “any claims, controversies, or disputes arising between us and in any way related to or arising out of the relationship created by this Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration” using the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The decedents’ representatives objected to arbitration and filed suit in county court, where they requested a declaratory judgment that their claims were not subject to arbitration. They moved to stay arbitration. After the AAA—itself, not through a duly empaneled arbitrator or arbitrators—made an “administrative determination” not to proceed without the parties’ mutual agreement or until the court decided the issue of arbitrability, the trial court granted the decedents’ representatives’ motion to stay arbitration and denied the owners’ request to abate the lawsuits. The owners filed interlocutory appeals and the court of appeals eventually granted en banc review. 
         
          In a 7-6 split, the en banc Dallas Court held the trial court abused its discretion when it decided arbitrability issues that had been delegated to the arbitrator. Trial courts generally determine arbitrability unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Court explained that the arbitration agreements in this case had incorporated the AAA’s Commercial Rules, one of which provides that the arbitrator has the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Coupled with the broad scope of the arbitration agreements—which encompassed “any claims, controversies, or disputes arising between us and in any way related to or arising out of the relationship created by this Agreement”—the agreements evidenced a clear and unmistakable intent that arbitrability would be determined by the arbitrator. 
     The dissent acknowledged that “under ordinary circumstances” incorporation of the AAA’s commercial rules means the arbitrator is to decide arbitrability. However, the dissent argued, the circumstances of this case were not “ordinary” because (1) the AAA had declined to decide arbitrability, deferring to the trial court, and (2) the decedents’ representatives were not signatories to the arbitration agreements. The dissent, therefore, would have gone on to review the substance of the arbitrability issue and to find that the disputes were not subject to arbitration under the Texas Arbitration Act. 
          The majority responded that neither of the distinctions identified by the dissent justified creating an exemption from the general rule. The AAA was bound to decide arbitrability based on the parties’ agreements, and the trial court should not have acquiesced to the AAA’s “administrative decision” punting arbitrability to the trial court in violation of the parties’ contracts. The fact the dispute involved non-signatories was irrelevant because the arbitration agreements specifically bound “all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of [decedent], including that of the [decedent’s] family, heirs, guardian, executor, administrator and assigns.” The representatives’ claims for wrongful death and survivorship were “derived through or on behalf of” the deceased residents. Because they stood in the decedents’ legal shoes, the representatives were bound by the decedents’ arbitration agreements. The en banc Court therefore reversed the stay of arbitration and remanded with instructions to order the parties to arbitration. 
        NOTE: The “general rule” at issue here—whether incorporation of the AAA rules “constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator”—is set to be addressed by the Supreme Court of Texas early in its upcoming term. The Court has granted review and is scheduled to hear argument on the issue next month in MP Gulf of Mex., LLC v. Total E&P USA, Inc., Case No. 21-0028.

Vice Principals, the Fifth Amendment, and Negative Inferences

 Lurks v. Designer Draperies and Floors, Inc. 

 Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-21-00908-CV (July 27, 2022)
 Justices Schenck (Opinion, linked here), Osborne, and Smith 
While Lurks was attending to a disabled car in the right lane of the I-20 frontage road, Heitzman struck that car from behind, seriously injuring Lurks. Heitzman failed a field sobriety test at the scene, was arrested, and then tested well above the legal limit for blood alcohol. Lurks sued Designer Draperies and Floors (“DDF”), arguing that when Heitzman became intoxicated and decided to drive anyway, he was acting as a “vice principal” of DDF. “In other words, Lurks urge[d] that DDF step[ped] into the shoes of Heitzmann and is, therefore, directly liable for Lurks’s injuries.” 
The trial court, however, granted summary judgment to DDF, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. There was some evidence—and potential inferences from Heitzman’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in his deposition—that Heitzman “consum[ed] alcoholic beverages at DDF’s workplace, that he was drinking with employees of DDF, and, perhaps, that someone encouraged him to drive.” But none of this was sufficient even to raise a fact question that Heitzman’s conduct was “referable to DDF’s business,” which the Court ruled was essential to a “vice principal” theory of liability against DDF. 
Along the way, the Court assumed, without deciding, that “a jury would be allowed to draw negative inferences regarding Heitzmann’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Because of the Court’s determination that Lurks had failed to adduce any evidence that Heitzman’s alleged misconduct was “referable to DDF’s business,” indulging this assumption didn’t matter. But it wades into murky waters. Heitzman was not a party to the lawsuit, even though his actions were a focus of the case. The question whether a witness’s invoking the Fifth will give rise to a negative inference against someone else is difficult, to say the least. The answer may differ depending on whether the issue arises in Texas or federal court, and whether the witness can be said to have been acting for the other party such that his or her invocation of privilege can be attributed to that party as his words would have been under Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(D). Compare, e.g., P.C. as next friend of C.C. v. E.C., 594 S.W.3d 459, 461-65 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.), with Wil-Roye Inv. Co. II v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 142 S.W.3d 393, 403-07 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

Fifth Court: Twenty-Plus Years of Precedent on Bankruptcy Trustee’s “Exclusive Standing” Implicitly Overruled by SCOTX

Moser v. Dillon Investments, LLC 

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-21-00204-CV (August 2, 2022) 
Justices Myers (Opinion, linked here), Osborne, and Nowell 

Mason claimed that, while staying at a hotel on June 30, 2017, she was taking a shower and the bathtub floor shifted, causing her to fall and hit her head. On June 13, 2019, Mason sued the hotel in state court for negligence. But in April 2018, Mason had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy without listing her potential claim against the hotel on her schedule of assets. By the end of 2018, Mason had received a discharge and the bankruptcy case had terminated.
The hotel initially sought summary judgment, alleging Mason lacked standing to assert the claim and that she was judicially estopped from bringing the claim. The hotel argued that because Mason had not disclosed the claim in her bankruptcy schedules, the claim remained with the bankruptcy estate and was not returned to her upon the bankruptcy’s termination. Mason then filed a motion in bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy to amend her schedules to add the negligence claim, which the bankruptcy court granted. 
In January 2021, Moser, the bankruptcy trustee, filed an amended petition in the state court case on behalf of Mason’s bankruptcy estate, alleging the same negligence claim against the hotel. The hotel moved for summary judgment, arguing the amended petition was filed after the two-year statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted the motion. 
Moser’s appeal centered on the relation-back doctrine. Section 16.068 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that when a party initially brings a timely claim, “a subsequent amendment or supplement to the pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment or supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.” But the relation-back doctrine does not apply to an amended petition when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the original petition. 
Mason first brought her negligence claim within the two-year statute of limitations, and Moser’s amended petition on behalf of the bankruptcy estate alleged the same facts as Mason’s original petition. So, to determine whether the relation-back doctrine applied, the court of appeals considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction when Mason first sued. 
The court of appeals explained that for the trial court to lack jurisdiction based on a lack of standing, Mason had to lack “constitutional” standing. The Court noted that courts have, at times, blurred the distinction between standing and capacity—a critical if sometimes confusing distinction, because standing is jurisdictional, while capacity is not. In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court held in Douglas v. Delp that a bankruptcy trustee had “exclusive standing” to bring claims on behalf of the estate, quoting a 1994 Fifth Circuit decision that did not expressly address the question of constitutional standing. After an extensive analysis of later Fifth Circuit cases on a bankruptcy trustee’s authority to bring claims on behalf of the estate as well as later Texas Supreme Court decisions addressing the distinction between standing and capacity, the court of appeals concluded the Texas Supreme Court had implicitly overruled Douglas and the various intermediate appellate decisions—including those of the Fifth Court—that had followed it. 
 Accordingly, the Court said, Mason had standing to bring her claim in 2019; she merely lacked capacity to assert it. Therefore, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction in 2019, Moser’s amended petition in 2021, in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee, related back to Mason’s timely 2019 petition, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.